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I. INTRODUCTION: POWER. RIGHTS, VALUES AND THE 
COMMON LAW 
Law is seen by many scholars as simply one of many social institutions, and, 
as such, permeated with social values and conflicts.1 In this view, law is not 
a source of truth, but a way of constructing a truth - a truth which will 
probably work in some people's interests and not in others'. In other words, 
law is an instrument whereby existing power structures are perpetuated, 
rather than a mechanism whereby power can be overcome by "right". 
In light of these insights, it does not necessarily make sense to rely on the law 
to preserve our so-called natural rights, although this is indeed an argument 
which is often used, by both lawyers and non-lawyers, to support the need 
for law in our society. If these "natural rights" are not reflected in the 
existing power structure in society, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
have them recognised by the law. Indeed, to the extent that they are not 
reflected in the existing power structure, it could be said that they are not 
rights at all. 
In this paper I will discuss one particular source of law: the common law. 
Common law is the law that is developed by judges on a case-by-case basis. It 
is part of our British heritage, having been "received" into the Australian 
colonies on the arrival of the British. Since it dates back to the middle ages, it 
covers most traditional areas of human activity, and forms a very important 
part of our legal tradition. Common law rules can be overridden by 
parliament, but if this has not occurred, it is possible to find parts of the 
common law that have not changed for hundreds of years.2 
1 See eg M Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Vintage Books, New York, 1979 (tr. 
Alan Sheridan). 
2 See eg State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell ( 1979) 142 CLR 6 17. 
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It was traditionally thought that common law was an autonomous 
institution, where all judges had to do was apply the right kind of reasoning 
and they would find the right result. Recently, it has been recognised more 
and more that common law judges do not find results: they choose them.3 Thus 
judges come under more and more scrutiny, both personally and 
professionally, as they are seen as active participants in the making of law.4 
People want to know about judges' backgrounds. It is not surprising that the 
vast majority of Australian judges are white, middle-class men.5 Nor is it 
surprising that the suggestion has often been made that this position judges 
hold in society affects their viewpoint, their sympathies, their values and 
priorities and, ultimately, their decisions.6 
In this paper I discuss one particular legal category which could be said to 
reflect judges' personal viewpoints: the standard of the reasonable man. First 
I will outline just what this standard means and where it is used. I will then 
go on to describe two examples of the application of the standard which 
suggest that perhaps judges' decisions and, indeed, their very reasoning, are 
affected by their position as men. 
II. TORT LAW 
The general area of law where the reasonable man comes into play is tort 
law. A tort is a civil wrong, which does not arise out of a contract, and for 
which money damages can be awarded as a remedy to the wronged person. 
Examples include negligence, public and private nuisance, trespass to 
property, assault, battery, defamation, wrongful imprisonment and malicious 
3 See generally the work of Professor Julius Stone. 
4 See M Kirby, The Judges, Sydney, 1983 at 17. 
5 See id pp 16-17. Of course, because all judges were once lawyers, they will 
reflect the socioeconomic makeup of the legal profession. On this, see D 
Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989 pp 79-110. 
Judges tend to be an even more elite group than the legal profession at large, 
however, because of the class- and gender-based hierarchy of the legal 
profession and the practice of appointing as judges only those at the top of 
the hierarchy. 
6 See Kirby, above note 4 at 17. 
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prosecution. In every tort case there is a plaintiff, who is the wronged 
person, and a defendant, who is the person accused of committing the wrong. 
HI. NEGLIGENCE 
The tort of negligence has been a very important instrument for the last 100 
years or so in obtaining compensation for people who are injured by the 
actions of others. However, it does not provide compensation for everyone, 
only for those who were wrongfully injured. In order to establish what 
conduct is wrongful and what is not, the law must develop a standard by 
which to judge the actions of the defendant. 
A. DUTY OF CARE 
The standard of the reasonable man is applied at various different stages of 
negligence cases, but in this paper I will be alluding to only two. First, it is 
used to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, or 
whether the relationship between the two parties was such that a 
reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his 
actions would affect the plaintiff and thus taken care not to injure him or her. 
It should be noted, however, that the foresight of the reasonable man is not 
the only element in the calculation. Policy considerations may be taken into 
account to exclude a duty of care even where the effect of the defendant's 
actions on the plaintiff is reasonably foreseeable? 
7 There is a further consideration applied in Australia: proximity. This is not the 
place to discuss the meaning of this rather vague concept. For explanation by 
its original author, see Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 per Deane J. The 
proximity notion does not make any difference to the need to establish what 
the reasonable man would have foreseen. 
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B. BREACH OF DUTY 
Secondly, there is the question whether the defendant took enough care to 
prevent the plaintiff from being injured. The meaning of negligence is, in 
essence, that someone was not careful enough. If the standard of care 
observed by the defendant was up to, or above, the standard set by the law, 
the plaintiff (or injured person) cannot receive any compensation. If the 
defendant did not exercise the level of care required by the standard, his or 
her conduct is judged wrongful, and he or she must pay compensation. 
The way the law has set this standard is by reference to the reasonable man, 
so the question becomes: did the defendant behave as the reasonable man 
would have in this situation? It is an "objective" standard, which means that 
generally speaking it does not matter if an individual defendant has some 
particular disability or for some other reason was unable to behave as the 
reasonable man would have done.8 Nor does it matter, broadly speaking, if 
the defendant was usually an excessively careful person and did not exhibit 
that usual carefulness.9 Such "subjective" elements are not taken into account; 
everyone is held to the same standard. 
The way the reasonable man responds to an apprehended danger to another 
person is by weighing three factors: probability, gravity and practicability. 
Probability is the probability of injury occurring; if it is very unlikely, the 
reasonable man may do nothing at all. Thus a cricket club was excused, in a 
1951 case, from negligence when a neighbour was hit by a ball. The 
likelihood of such an event was simply so slight that the club was justified in 
doing nothing to provide for the safety of the neighbours.10 Gravity refers to 
8 But see Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376. 
9 But see e.g medical negligence cases such as Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, holding that the standard in such 
cases is that of "the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have 
that special skill". 
10 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850. 
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the seriousness of the injury that will or might result if nothing is done. The 
more serious, the more the reasonable man will do to remove the risk. Thus 
an employer was held liable, again in 1951, for not providing protective 
goggles for a one-eyed worker, though it did not have to provide goggles for 
two-eyed workers, as the gravity of injury to the worker's good eye was far 
greater than the gravity of injury to the eye of a two-eyed worker.U These 
two considerations must be balanced against practicability, which involves 
the expense and difficulty of the measures which could eliminate the risk. The 
more probable and serious the injury, the greater the trouble to which the 
reasonable man will go in order to avoid it. The less probable and serious, 
the less he will do. 
IV. WHO IS THE REASONABLE MAN? 
It is fairly clear that initially at least when the law said man, it meant man, 
or a person of the male gender. In Britain, the reasonable man was also 
known as "the man on the Clapham omnibus;"12 in Australia, as "the man on 
the Bondi tram."13 In the United States, he has been referred to as "the man 
who takes the magazines at home and in the evening pushes the lawnmower 
in his shirtsleeves."14 As one feminist legal scholar has noted: 
These definitions refer to distinctly male prototypes--the man who works 
outside the home, legally governs the home, and participates in running the 
home only with regard to physical maintenance activities using machinery.15 
11  Paris v Stepney BC [1951] AC 367. 
12 Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933]1 KB 204 at 205. 
13 See J Fleming, The Law of Torts: Law Book Company, 7th ed, Sydney, 1987 at 
97. 
1 4 G Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs and Attitudes in the Law, Syracuse University Press, 
1985; quoted in L Finley, "A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues 
in a Torts Course" (1989) 1 Yale J.Law & Feminism 41 at 58. 
15 Finley, above note 14, at 58. 
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It could be added that they also refer to middle-class prototypes, notably 
through the assumption that the "reasonable man" has a yard, owns a 
lawnmower and wears a shirt and jacket to work. 
Nor is this kind of bias limited to English-based legal systems. In France, the 
standard is that of "le bon pere de famille," which translates literally as "the 
good father of the family" or, more idiomatically, as "the good family man."16 
This language suggests that the reasonable man is also assumed to be 
heterosexual, or at least not openly homosexual. 
There is a final sense in which it must be concluded that the reasonable man 
really is a man, and that is by the use of the word "reasonable." 
Reasonableness is a quality which is commonly associated, in our society, 
with the male gender, as are "objectivity" and "rationality." Women, on the 
other hand, are generally thought to be, and trained and in some sense 
expected to be, everything that men are not: unreasonable, subjective, and 
irrational. (Adjectives with less negative connotations include emotional 
and intuitive.) 
Yet, according to law, this is the standard by which we are all to be judged. If 
we do not behave as a reasonable man would have done, our behaviour is 
judged wrongful and we must pay for the damage it causes. Of course, it is 
possible for a middle class, heterosexual man to be negligent, or to exhibit 
less care than the reasonable man would have exhibited under the 
circumstances. Simply being male, middle class and heterosexual does not 
lead to a presumption that one has behaved reasonably. However, we must 
ask whether there is a significant bias in this standard: does the standard of 
the reasonable man make it more difficult for women, working class men and 
homosexual men to escape paying compensation in cases where they are 
accused of wrongdoing? There is a very strong possibility that it might. The 
16 The same scholar comments: "This definition reminds me that good fathers 
had absolute rights over their female relatives. These women were deprived 
of legal personhood by being part of the family. If the good father did not live 
up to the paternalistic ideal, the law would rarely intervene." Ibid. 
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reasoning that might lead to this conclusion is suggested in a fictitious case 
called Fardell v Potts, which was invented by the British humorist A P 
Herbert and published in his book Uncommon Law in 1927: 
[M]y own researches incline me to agree, that in all that mass of 
authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no 
single mention of a reasonable woman. It was ably insisted before 
us that such an omission, extending over a century and more of 
judicial pronouncements, must be something more than a coincidence; 
that among the innumerable tributes to the reasonable man there 
might be expected at least some passing reference to a reasonable 
person of the opposite sex; that no such reference is found, for the 
simple reason that no such being is contemplated by law; that legally 
at least there is no reasonable woman ... 
It is probably no mere chance that in our legal text-books the 
problems relating to married women are usually considered 
immediately after the pages devoted to idiots and lunatics. Indeed, 
there is respectable authority for saying that at Common Law this 
was the status of a woman . .. .It is no bad thing that the law of the 
land should here and there conform with the known facts of 
everyday experience. The view that there exists a class of beings 
illogical, impulsive, careless, irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, 
and vain, free for the most part from those worthy and repellent 
excellences which distinguish the Reasonable Man, and devoted to 
the irrational arts of pleasure and attraction, is one which should 
be as welcome and as well accepted in our Courts as it is in our 
drawing-rooms--and even in Parliament. .. .I find that at Common 
Law a reasonable woman does not exist.17 
17 A P Herbert, Uncommon Law 1, 8th ed, London, 1969, 5-6; quoted in L 
Bender, "A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort" (1988) 38 J Leg Ed 3 
at 21-22. 
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Lawyers, including feminist lawyers, find this passage very amusing, even 
hilarious. We must ask why this is: could the humour of the decision be found 
in its plausibility?18  What is plausible about it is not that it treats a female 
defendant more leniently on the basis that she is incapable of being 
reasonable; it is the use of a judge's perception of the "known facts of 
everyday experience" to arrive at the conclusion that women are incapable 
of being reasonable. That conclusion being reached, the more likely result is 
that, since the law rewards and requires reasonableness, women will 
always be regarded as deviants by the law and suffer the attendant 
disadvantages. 
In recent years, some judges have taken to referring to the standard of the 
reasonable person, rather than the reasonable man, presumably in an attempt 
to eliminate overt gender bias from the law. However, we must not take that 
as the end of the story. There is still a serious possibility that the use of 
gender-neutral language merely serves to mask the maleness of the standard­
to tum an explicit male norm into an implicit male norm. This possibility is 
particularly serious if the picture of a "person" in the judge's mind is one of a 
man, which is very likely when the judge is a man and when our society in 
any event treats maleness as the standard or normal state for a human being, 
and femaleness as a variation, an aberration. If judges automatically and 
unconsciously think of a "person" as male, the image is also likely to be 
infected by all the stereotypes that make men male in our society. To the 
extent that women do not live up to those stereotypes, they cannot help but be 
disadvantaged. This argument becomes even stronger when we remember that 
the prime quality of the reasonable "person" is reasonableness, a quality 
which in our society is gendered male. 
I will now discuss two concrete examples to show the kind of impact that the 
maleness of the reasonable man standard can have. They do not relate to 
women as defendants, but to situations where plaintiffs are (or are more 
1 8  See Littleton, "Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes" 
(1989) 41 Stan L Rev at 751, 767. 
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likely to be) women, and to the reaction that the law expects the reasonable 
man to have to those situations. In each case, the answer to this question is 
crucial to the conclusion as to whether the (usually female) plaintiff receives 
any damages. 
V. NERVOUS SHOCK 
The first is the law of nervous shock, or the situation where a person 
witnesses another person being injured by the defendant and suffers shock 
resulting in a psychiatric disorder, sometimes combined with physical 
manifestations. In the majority of cases, the plaintiff and the physically 
injured person had some kind of pre-existing relationship, and an especially 
common one is the relationship of mother and child. This situation is treated 
by the law as raising a question of duty of care, and in order to establish 
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the law asks 
whether it would have been foreseeable to the reasonable man that his 
actions would affect this person. 
Now, the effect on this person is very foreseeable indeed if one sees society 
as a complex web of connection and interdependence. The impact on the 
mother of seeing the child injured is something which would occur to anyone 
who sees the world this way, and it just so happens that women are trained 
to see the world this way. It is a peculiarly "feminine" vision.19 But does the 
reasonable man see the world this way? Does he think about the 
fundamental connectedness of all human beings as he pushes the 
lawnmower? He may or may not, but one thing is fairly sure: he is less hkely 
to than his wife, his mother or his sister. When he is driving down the road, 
does he think about the mothers of the children he might injure if he drives 
carelessly? Again, he is less likely to than a woman in the same situation. 
1 9 I draw here on the work of C Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Harvard UP, 
Cambridge MA, 1982. I do so without necessarily endorsing her theory to the 
extent that it may have normative force, that is, to the extent that it might 
lead to the conclusion that concern with connection is good. I merely use it it 
support the observation that in our society, the fact that women tend to 
value connection is an observable phenomenon. 
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Thus the reasonable man standard means that we are likely to reach the legal 
conclusion that nervous shock victims are simply unforeseeable, and are 
therefore owed no duty and cannot recover damages for their injury. This is 
indeed the legal conclusion reached by the High Court of Australia in a 1939 
case, where a mother had seen her young son dragged from a ditch, drowned, 
after some council workers had negligently failed to put a fence around the 
ditch.20 Latham CJ said: 
It is ... not a common experience of mankind that the spectacle, even of 
the sudden and distressing death of a child, produces any 
consequence of more than a temporary nature in the case of 
bystanders or even close relatives who see the body after death has 
taken place.21 
In 1984, this view was decisively refuted by the High Court. 22 It is 
interesting to note, however, that it had already been seriously eroded by a 
1970 case where the plaintiff was a man who had witnessed the immediate 
aftermath of a horrific accident involving some co-workers.Z3 This might 
lead us to speculate on whether the earlier court's distrust of the plaintiff­
mother was conditioned on her gender and/ or its lack of understanding of a 
mother's position. This proposition cannot be conclusively proved to be true, 
if only because of changes in High Court personnel between the two cases, 
but it would be consistent with the attitude the law has traditionally taken 
of women in other areas, notably its attitude towards rape victims. 
In the 1984 case, the plaintiff had seen her husband seriously injured in a 
road accident, and entertained for some weeks the belief that he was going to 
die. One of the judges said: 
2° Chester v Waverley Corporation (1939) 62 CLR 1. 
21 At 10. 
22 ]aensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549. 
23 Mt [sa Mines v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383. 
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It is simply out of accord with medical knowledge and human 
experience to deny that it is reasonably foreseeable that the shock 
suffered by a mother on seeing the body of her infant child, whom 
she was seeking, raised from the bottom of a water-filled trench 
might well be such as to cause psychoneurosis or mental illness.24 
Note that here, however, the courts' willingness to recognise the 
foreseeability of the injury is based in part on "medical knowledge". This 
reveals the interplay between law and other institutions, especially medical 
science. It could suggest that law is willing to believe science (in this case, 
psychiatry) where it is unwilling to believe a woman, or a mother. 
In answering the question whether there is a duty of care in a nervous shock 
case, the law holds all people to the same standard, but men benefit, because 
the standard prescribes behaviour and attitudes which are likely to be 
descriptively accurate in the case of men, but not in the case of women. In this 
particular case, on the other hand, it could be said that women defendants 
benefit because they are held to a lower standard (or required to have less 
foresight) than they would if a feminine standard were applied. However, 
this perception would be the result of a fairly common habit in our society of 
implicitly or explicitly using men as the norm and comparing women. Men are 
the referent, women the comparator. If we took women as our referent, 
instead of men, we would find that everyone should be treated as having 
more foresight, which would lead to the conclusion that men receive an 
unfair advantage under the present standard. The standard is unfair in the 
sense that we would likely find that women more often conformed to the 
higher standard in any event: far from being a question of women being 
excused from having to show their usual foresight, it would be a question of 
men being excused from showing any more foresight than they do because of 
the power they hold as men. 
24 faensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 590. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that, because nervous shock is a peculiarly 
feminine injury, the plaintiffs who are disadvantaged by the application of 
the male standard are more likely to be women than men. 
VI. POLICE "NEGLIGENCE" 
The second example I will discuss is that where police fail to respond to a 
call for help from a victim of violent crime, or fail in some other way to 
protect such a person. Can the victim (once again, more likely to be a woman 
than a man) sue the police for failing to prevent an attack? 
Generally speaking, the answer is no, because the courts hold for policy 
reasons that the police owe no duty to individual members of the community. 
Their duty is to the community as a whole.25 But imagining for a moment that 
those policy reasons are not present, and a duty is owed (as indeed it is in 
certain circumstances):26 the question is how the reasonable man would 
react to the danger the plain tiff was facing. 
This is another situation where one's reaction and behaviour are likely to be 
dictated by one's gender. Women live in constant fear of violent attacks on 
their bodies; men, generally speaking, do not. (The reasonable man, being 
middle-class, heterosexual and probably white, is in fact the safest member of 
society.) Thus violence means something different to women from what it 
means to men. I suggest that it is more serious to women than to men, because 
to a woman who is attacked, the attack is the culmination of a lifetime of fear 
and vulnerability, and all the more distressing for the fact that it takes on the 
character of an inevitable concomitant of one's gender. To a white middle 
class heterosexual man, by contrast, it is regrettable, even infuriating, but 
more a matter of rotten luck than of one's destiny, and thus unlikely to have 
any severe long-term psychological effects. 
25 See eg Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorks!1ire [1989] AC 53 (House of Lords). 
26 See Doe v Board of Commissioners of Police for Metropolitan Toronto (1989) 58 
DLR (4th) 396 (Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada). 
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I have already explained that in order to ascertain whether there has been a 
breach of duty, the law takes the view that the more serious the situation the 
defendant is asked to prevent, the more the defendant should do to prevent it. 
A male perception of violence leads to the conclusion that a certain amount 
must be done; the female perception leads to the conclusion that more must be 
done, for the situation appears a lot more serious. Once again, it might be 
said that all this means is that the reasonable man standard leads to a 
situation where the law requires less of women than women would 
otherwise require of themselves. However, it must be borne in mind that the 
majority of police officers are men, and the majority of victims of violent 
crime are women. Thus the perspective of the victim is excluded and the 
perspective of the defendant is dominant. The system, in other words, is 
skewed in favour of defendants (who happen to be mostly men) and against 
plaintiffs (who happen to be mostly women). 
VII. AN EMPATHETIC APPROACH? 
Is this how the reasonable man would want the system to be? Is it a 
reasonable system? Or, putting it another way, would it be unreasonable to 
require a defendant to look at the situation from the victim's point of view to 
decide how much damage is going to be done and hence how much should be 
done to prevent that damage? 
What I have just suggested is an empathetic approach. We judge the 
defendant's actions on the basis of the extent to which he or she thought 
about the plaintiff's position, rather than allowing the defendant to see all 
victims as the same (which would usually mean he or she sees them as like 
him or her). It would probably mean that more would be required from a 
defendant where a woman was in physical danger than where a man was in 
the same physical danger, for the same physical danger will ultimately lead 
to more harm in the case of a woman than in the case of a man. 
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VIII. THE MEANING OF REASONABLENESS 
Is this approach unreasonable? Is it unreasonable to be empathetic, or to 
require or expect empathy from others? This depends very much on one's 
perspective, and particularly on one's view of human nature. There are three 
possibilities I would like to mention. 
The first is the view of human nature as fundamentally separate and self­
interested, which corresponds roughly to the traditional liberal view, the 
view on which capitalism is in a rough sense based. It therefore corresponds 
to what in our society we would think of as "conservative" politics. This is 
just the view that we would expect judges, given their position in society, to 
take. If one took this view, one would say yes, it is unreasonable to require 
or expect empathy, and moreover, it is unreasonable to be empathetic. This 
more or less describes the position of the common law. It does not require 
defendants to take into account a plaintiff's gender, class or any other social 
variable; it does not require empathy before a defendant can be said to have 
exercised reasonable care. 
The second is the view of people as essentially interconnected and 
responsible for each other, which corresponds roughly to what might be 
called the "feminine" view;27 it would also be the view that most people of 
various socialist persuasions would take. From such a standpoint, empathy 
is not unreasonable at all. 
The third possibility is that one rejects the idea that there is such a thing as 
human nature in the first place. Even under such a view, one might still 
conclude that it is not unreasonable to set up a norm or standard which 
requires people to think about and feel for each other's situations, if only 
because one thinks that such an attitude is desirable and worth encouraging. 
27 See above note 19 and accompanying text. 
Sister in Law Volume 1 1996 68 
In other words, one might still have criteria for what is reasonable even 
without a position on what is essentially human. 
Still, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the law embodies certain 
assumptions about human nature, and that those assumptions draw from the 
experience of the authors of the law as male. Empathy is a trait which in our 
society is gendered feminine; it goes with and is probably required by the 
mothering, nurturant role assigned to women in this society, and as such it is 
encouraged in women. The reasonable man, on the other hand, is not 
empathetic. He does not see the power differentials in society which make 
encounters with violence more distressing for women than for men. Therefore 
no-one else is required to see them. 
All of this raises questions about the meaning of "reasonableness" in our 
society. I suggested before that it is a trait which is gendered male, being 
based on reason, rationality, and objectivity, but to the extent that we see it 
as a generically good frame of mind, we could gender it female, and call male 
assumptions themselves unreasonable. If we take a certain view of what is 
good and what is truly and fully human, we can say that empathy, for 
example, is good and therefore reasonable; if we take another view of what 
is good and what is truly and fully human, we can say that self-interest and 
lack of active care and concern for others are good and therefore reasonable. 
It seems fairly clear that the law takes the latter approach. 
IX. CONCLUS I ON: THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES AND THE 
PARTIALITY OF THE LAW 
In closing I will consider what kind of standard the law might put in place of 
the reasonable man, if it were decided to take seriously the need to 
accommodate all perspectives. Clearly it would not help simply to substitute 
the empathetic woman for the reasonable man. This would replace a male 
norm with a female norm, and be just as discriminatory. However, we do 
need to ask ourselves: to what extent should the law enforce or encourage 
attitudes? (This is a separate question, of course, from the question of the 
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extent to which the law can enforce or encourage attitudes.) If empathy is a 
good thing, because it prevents more injury and can lead to healthier society, 
perhaps the law should embrace it as a norm. 
Many people would be horrified by this suggestion, and I would like to 
suggest the reason for that horror. One usually thinks of the law as an 
institution which is primarily responsible for visiting on people unpleasant 
sanctions such as imprisonment. Many people while reading this article have 
no doubt had at the back of their mind an image of such an unpleasant 
sanction. However, leaving aside the damage to a person's reputation when 
sued in a professional capacity, the sanctions visited on tort defendants are 
not especially unpleasant because of one very important factor: insurance. It 
generally goes without saying that in any negligence case, the defendant is 
insured against liability (third party insurance) and it is the insurance 
company which is conducting the litigation, using the "defendant's" name 
under the right of subrogation. For this reason, most negligence litigation is 
somewhat farcical, because it is enforcing standards against someone who 
has no stake in the outcome of the proceedings. To the extent that insurance is 
compulsory (as in the case of motor accidents) or something which no person 
or company in its right mind would be without, a finding of negligence is not 
likely to make much of a difference to the defendant's future behaviour. 
Similarly, the threat of future liability is unlikely to affect the defendant's 
behaviour before the fact. The most difference liability can make to the 
defendant's interests is to increase its insurance premium, hardly a reason to 
take seriously the law's exhortations to change one's attitude. Thus the 
horror people might feel at my earlier suggestion should be mitigated by the 
realisation that the norms embraced by the law of negligence do not 
necessarily dictate people's behaviour, and the sanctions applied for 
deviation from the norms of negligence are only very slight. Something would 
have to go drastically wrong, under the present system, before a defendant 
would be imprisoned. 
So what is the role of negligence? Should its norms be shaped around the 
needs of the insurance industry, since they are the ones who pay? Courts 
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would deny that possibility most vehemently; in fact, they regard the 
defendant's status of being insured or otherwise as completely irrelevant to 
the issues in a negligence case. 
Perhaps there is something to be said for the proposition that the law should 
develop in such a way as to protect the insurance industry, but another role 
can be suggested for law in this context: it can be an effective way of 
transmitting messages to the members of society about what kind of 
behaviour is acceptable and what is not acceptable. The law's choice of 
message is just as important when it is consciously addressed to society as a 
whole as it would be if the message were being sent to an individual in order 
to change that person's behaviour. The role of the law in transmitting such 
messages may only be a symbolic one, but just think about the importance of 
that symbol: law is the repository of state power in our society. It is, in some 
sense, a metaphor for power and for the dominant ideology. Taking women's 
concerns and interests seriously would convey the message that finally men 
are not the only ones who are pulling the strings, and to receive that message 
would be empowering in itself. 
Therefore, a strong argument can be made against the law's systematic 
exclusion of all points of view but one. The standard of the reasonable man 
clearly excludes the point of view of women, and probably those of working­
class, non-white and homosexual men as well. Modifying the standard to 
include the views of women, or the voice which in our society is gendered 
feminine, could be an important step towards inclusion of "minority" points 
of view. 
The main message with which I have been concerned in this paper is the way 
that institutions and standards which appear to be neutral in fact do have a 
standpoint, a point of view, which is reflected in the practices of the 
institutions and the content of standards. The reasonable man, to the extent 
that he does not foresee the mothers of the children he might injure if he is 
negligent, and does not take into account the drastic effect that violence is 
likely to have on a woman, is a man and not a person. This is not to say that 
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he is necessarily wrong, though arguments can be made that he is, depending 
on how we construct the idea of reasonableness. It is simply to say that he is 
partial, biased, and can only tell us part of the story. In this paper, I have 
made some suggestions as to what the rest of the story might be. 
